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TRANSFORMATIVE PLANNING PRACTICES


How and why cities change

Cities change in unpredictable ways. Efforts to steer them in one direction or another, by property developers, business owners, residents, politicians, social movements, and the city-building professions themselves, inevitably meet with resistance and become a struggle. We might call this the struggle to define and shape the good city. That struggle takes place in city council chambers and newspapers; in banks and boardrooms; in bars and cafés; on the street and in schools. It is a struggle to shape and protect and improve places, to expand or contract accepted notions of belonging, to advance new or defend old notions of environmental care. All of these are issues that affect everyday life in manifold ways, and therefore evoke powerful emotions, like greed, fear, anxiety, anger, despair, hope, attachment, love. Consequently everyone has a stake in the city and how it is changing, and many people have theories about who has the power to do what, and just who are the real movers and shakers.

This book is concerned with the contribution of the city-building professions to the transformation of cities, but it recognizes that these professions do not act alone, and that they are most effective when they act in a transparently political way, in association with residents, politicians, and mobilized communities, negotiating an (always temporary) consensus about the best ways of living together. This chapter explores the possibilities and realities of transformative planning practices, asking what kinds of knowledges and know-how make transformation possible.

I have chosen three stories around which to build an analysis of transformative planning for the mongrel cities of the 21st century. The first concerns a recent land-use struggle between indigenous Australians and their white neighbours in an inner Sydney suburb. The second tells of a community mobilization in partnership with a university research effort in East St Louis, USA, that was successful in reversing structural and political processes of abandonment. The third, very much a work in progress, is the current attempt of the City of Birmingham to reinvent itself as *cosmopolis*, a city in which dynamic new sources of growth might be enjoyed across culturally diverse neighbourhoods in a more inclusionary approach to urban regeneration.

In telling these stories, my approach is not that of the comparative case study. There is



very little that is comparable, structurally speaking, about these three situations. Rather I have searched for new approaches, for breakthroughs in dealing with long-standing problems of inequality and exclusion. And I have chosen examples that operate at different urban scales and with different time frames. Each story brings something different to my larger purpose: that of understanding why and how cities change, and who are the key change agents. Above all, I seek to eschew simple answers, or unified theory. Some believe that capital produces urban space and that (increasingly global) markets shape urban destinies. Others have faith that social movements are a counterforce. Some see expert knowledge and rational analysis as crucial. Still others see bureaucrats acting through state agencies as enforcers of societal norms and agents of control over who does what in cities, according to some larger forces that are able to impose class, patriarchal, cultural and other forms of power. The city-building professions jostle each other for pride of place as creators of cities, while inwardly agonizing that 'they' (whether landscape/architects, planners, engineers, urban designers) are really only cogs in some machine that others are in control of. The planning enterprise, to the extent that it has been normatively concerned with questions of social and environmental justice in relation to urban change, has been particularly self-critical of its role.

Planning theorists have argued that planning activity serves primarily to assist market forces or, alternatively, that planning is in the vanguard of social change, and every position in between. Urban researchers either start with a preferred theory and set out to prove it through a carefully selected case study, or they start with a case study from which they hope to build a general theory of planning and urban change. Both approaches are fatally flawed. The former approach is plainly biased from the outset. The latter, the attempt to see the whole world through one grain of sand – to build theory from one local government case study, or one policy sector involved in one project, or even a study of a national planning system – writes off what is arguably a crucial determinant of any change, namely contextual specificity. Compiling case studies and generalizing from them (to produce 'best practices', for example) does not overcome this problem, as the more we attempt generalizations, the further we remove ourselves from the specific historical, cultural, institutional, political and economic circumstances that shape place. Similarly, the question that has preoccupied a number of planning theorists, 'Is planning activity system-maintaining or system-transforming?' is a useless question when posed in that general way. It is quite conceivable that actions intended as catalysts of transformation, of urban regeneration, may have positive effects in some cities and negative effects in others, because of the different mixture of local ingredients.

In the process of understanding how planning activity might become, and when it actually is, transformative, then, I start from an openly normative position: I seek examples of planning working for greater social and environmental justice, and supporting culturally pluralist ways of living together. That is my definition of transformative (and I acknowledge that it will always be contested). But my goal is not a general theory of 'radical' planning or of urban change. It is a better understanding of the range of factors and players that are important: from leadership to discourse to ideas to institutions to governance practices to social mobilizations, to name just a few. As practitioners move from neighbourhood to metropolitan to regional arenas, and experience a range of

cultural, political, institutional and economic circumstances (these things can change significantly in any one city, in even a single decade), they need not so much a general theory of transformative planning, as *a feel for the game*,¹ a repertoire of stories and experiences from which they have learnt and which enable them to become what Bourdieu (1977: 8) calls 'virtuoso social actors', in contexts rarely of their choosing and never entirely under their control.

The intention of the following three stories is to contribute in small part to that feel for the game. Hence my choice of examples. The first concerns a lone consultant, called in by a city council to 'put out a fire'. It was a site-specific conflict, and a relatively short-term gig for the consultant, but the effects of her intervention nevertheless may prove to be quite profound. The second concerns a ten-year involvement by university researchers with a marginalized community, during which relationships are developed, new processes become institutionalized, and habits of thought are changed. This is a bottom-up, community-based story of transformative planning. The third example is of a city, like an ocean-liner, trying to change its course. The captain is the City Council, but part of the change of direction is an effort to involve everyone on board, every section of the community.

Each story offers a different 'planning paradigm': the first I will call 'therapeutic planning', an extension of the communicative planning approach; the second, 'empowerment planning', inherits a more radical tradition of social mobilization. The third story is not so easily categorized, partly because we don't know the 'ending' yet, but it contains mixtures of institutional, social movement, and leadership components. Perhaps the labels are only important to theorists, staking out their turf. I am not seeking to engage in theoretical 'truth wars' here. I am more interested in what works, when, how and why, and I do not expect any one theoretical camp to have all the answers to these questions.

I am particularly interested in the capacity of the actors in each case to imagine themselves in a different story, to imagine alternatives to apparently insoluble conflicts or situations that appeared to be without hope. I ask what forms of planning, supported by what forms of urban governance, social movements, and modes of citizenship, are best able to accommodate difference and reverse exclusion and marginality. And I am mindful of the context of planning in the USA, UK, and Australia: as already racialized liberal democracies in which planning, as a state-directed activity, has always been implicated in a cultural (as well as class) politics, and almost always on the side of the dominant culture and class.

REDFERN, SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA: FROM FEAR TO HOPE²

You can't take people where you haven't been yourself . . . we need, as individuals and as communities, to be about getting people to deal with the fears which immobilize us and bar us from our basic instincts towards growth, change, and harmony.

(King, 1981: 232)

What follows is an account of a recent cross-cultural conflict over land-use in inner Sydney, Australia, and its resolution through a *therapeutic process* in which a space is created for speaking the unspeakable, for talk of fear and loathing, as well as of hope and transformation. 'Therapeutic' needs a brief explanation, since its only previous use in the planning field was over 30 years ago, by Sherry Arnstein (1969) in her famous 'ladder of citizen participation'. Therapy featured in the bottom rungs of her ladder, which ascended from disempowering techniques of participation to more empowering ones. Arnstein was describing processes that made people feel good, by consulting them and appearing to listen to their concerns, and yet did not take their views seriously let alone give them any autonomy to act on their own behalf. For her, therapy was akin to manipulation. This is not the way in which I am using the term. For me, it denotes an essential quality of community organization and social planning. As Lee (1986: 21) has argued, 'people who are organized and who become effective in rendering their environment relatively more malleable will begin to perceive themselves differently, as subjects not objects, as people who develop a vision of a better world and who can act coherently to achieve it'. The social planning endeavour can be seen as the process of bringing people together not only to share their experiences and work in solidarity, but also to work through their differences (some of which, in cities of increasing diversity, may be quite profound) in transformative ways. I am also using 'therapy' in its psychological sense, as part of an acknowledgement that many planning disputes are about relationships, and therefore emotions, rather than conflicts over resources. That is certainly the case in the story that follows. I use the term 'transformative' to describe those actions which contribute to a more socially and environmentally just city, and one which is tolerant of difference, open and culturally pluralist.

The story concerns the future of a factory site immediately adjacent to the residential area known as The Block in the inner Sydney neighbourhood of Redfern. The Block had been a 1970s federal government initiative that had granted urban Aboriginal land rights. This area has received a lot of media and political attention in recent years as housing owned by the Aboriginal Housing Corporation deteriorated, and the area became a centre of drug dealing and drug taking. Local opinion has been dramatically divided regarding the Aboriginal presence. Some non-indigenous locals hoped that the state government would 'clean up' the area before the Olympic Games in 2000 (they didn't), while other non-indigenous residents remain firmly committed to a multi-racial neighbourhood, as a symbol of a wider reconciliation process in the nation.

In the 1980s the local (South Sydney) council had rezoned the factory site for community use, which meant that when the factory closed down a decade later, the Council had to acquire the site. It then tried to rush through an approval to demolish the buildings on the site, in sympathy with the conservative white residents' faction who wanted the site to become a park with a prominent police station at its centre. This group expressed strong disapproval of any use of the site for Aboriginal purposes. A second group, the Redfern Aboriginal Corporation, wanted the buildings and site used for Aboriginal economic and community purposes, including a training facility. And a third

group, white residents calling themselves Redfern Residents for Reconciliation (RRR), supported the Aboriginal group and the larger issue of ongoing Aboriginal presence in the area.

After being embarrassed by resident protests, the Council backtracked and hired a social planning consultant, Dr Wendy Sarkissian, to conduct a consultation process that would result in recommendations for a Master Plan for the 2200 square meter site.³ The consultant's initial scoping of the situation suggested to her that there was such hostility between the three identifiable groups of residents that any attempt at a general meeting to start the process would either meet with boycott from one or more groups, or end up in violence. Her strategy therefore was to organize a series of meetings. For the first few months, separate meetings were held with each of the three 'camps'. These included small meetings in people's living rooms, larger meetings in more public settings, meetings with children, and meetings with members of the Aboriginal community using a Black architect as mediator. Eventually, after three months of dialogic preparation, a 'speak-out' was organized in which each group agreed to participate. This latter was the most risky part of the whole process in that it was the most likely to get out of hand. The point of participation in this event was for people to say what they felt, to speak their feelings, no matter how toxic, or painful, it might be for others to hear. The hope, implicit in such an event, is that as well as speaking the unspeakable – that is performing a sort of cathartic function for all those carrying anger or fear or betrayal inside themselves – the words will also be heard, in their full emotion, by those whose ears and hearts have previously been closed.

At the time that the speak-out was held, three months into the process, there had deliberately been no discussion (and certainly no drawings) of alternative uses of the site. The consultant's intention was to encourage the 'real issues' at stake to be aired, prior to any site-specific discussions. The 'real issues' ranged from sheer resentment on the part of conservative whites at the Aboriginal presence in 'their' neighbourhood, to concerns with personal safety and children's well-being related to the presence of drug-dealing and drug-taking. On the part of indigenous people, there was anger and sadness at 200 years of domination by 'white fellas' who even now had little understanding of their history and culture. At one point in the speak-out, the consultant herself was verbally attacked by a tearful Aboriginal woman storyteller, who demanded to know how the consultant thought she could shift 200 years of racist history in a few months, with a few meetings. There is no satisfactory answer to such a profound question, only the honest answer in this case, which was the attempt to create the space, in one place, at one point in time, where perceptions might shift, where public learning might occur, and some larger transformation take place.

And such a shift did in fact take place. Interestingly, before the speak-out, the consultant had been criticized by those white residents sympathetic to the indigenous desires for the site, for her overly 'therapeutic' approach, for too much talk about feelings. But clearly what had been happening during this initial period of meetings and listening was *the creation of a safe space in which parties could meet and speak without fear of being dismissed, attacked, or humiliated*. The speak-out would not have been possible without this preparatory work, which simultaneously involved the building of trust in the

consultant and her team. The speak-out itself also had to be designed as a safe space, and this was achieved in part by formalizing and ceremonializing the activities.⁴

It was only after the speak-out (and the painstaking communicative preparation for it) that Sarkissian was able to move the process on, to enable joint group discussions and negotiations, to forge a set of principles for deciding the future use/s of the site, and finally to a set of meetings to draw up guidelines to present to the Council. One of the operating principles guiding the consultant was the determination not to force closure before there was the possibility of a genuine agreement rather than a mere 'deal', an unsatisfactory compromise. That agreement finally came, not without pain, after nine months of talk, and a budget of about \$50,000. The outcome, ten guidelines for a Masterplan, was a breakthrough of sorts, in that the conservative white residents backed off from their opposition to *any* Aboriginal use of the site and agreed to some training facilities. This neighbourhood story of the micro-sociology of a land-use dispute may seem like small potatoes in the grand scheme of things, but its outcome actually signifies a remarkable shift in the willingness of one group of residents to co-exist with another. In that sense it was transformative, in unraveling previous notions of the unthinkable.

COMMENTARY: THERAPEUTIC PLANNING

There's a lot missing from this story as I've told it. I haven't filled in the institutional details of the local council planning process or explained the local political culture. I chose to focus on the transformative role of one practitioner because that seems to be the critical ingredient, *in this story*, in bringing about change. But before I go deeper into her work here (which I will argue is not unique), it is salutary to note that what made it possible for Sarkissian to be called in was the social mobilization by progressive sections of the local community. They had a different view of what their neighbourhood could be, and they chose to challenge the local council. That council, in turn, was more responsive than one might normally expect in Australian local government, perhaps because any conflict involving indigenous peoples was likely to draw national attention.

This kind of planning work, involving dialogue and negotiation across the gulf of cultural difference, requires its practitioners to be fluent in a range of ways of knowing and communicating: from storytelling to listening to interpreting visual and body language. It would seem to be a model that is very relevant to the new complexities of nation-building and community development in multicultural societies. It is an excellent model in situations where direct, fact-to-face meetings are unthinkable or unmanageable due to prior histories of conflict and/or marginalization. In such cases, the use of narrative, of people telling their own stories about how they perceive the situation, becomes a potential consensus-building tool for unearthing issues unapproachable in a solely rational manner.

For most complex and highly charged public policy issues, sound expert analysis plays an important role in shaping the possibilities for agreement. So, too, do well-planned, well-executed, face-to-face negotiations. But when the parties involved have been at odds

for generations, or come from disparate cultural traditions, or where there is a history of marginalization, something more than the usual tool-kit of negotiation and mediation is needed, some 'method' which complements but also transcends the highly rational processes typical of the communicative action model developed in the 1990s.⁵ In the case just discussed, that 'something more' was the speak-out, which provided an occasion for dealing with history in highly personal, narrative, and emotional ways. There are other possible methods, using drama, for example, or music, or other more symbolic or non-verbal means of story telling and communicating deeply felt emotions. Indigenous people are often, with good reason, preoccupied with the unacknowledged and therefore unfinished business of the past. It is particularly important for them to be able to tell their stories. But all parties involved in planning disputes have a story, and there is growing recognition of the importance of the telling and hearing of stories in the process of conflict resolution. Narratives about the past can be vital in navigating long-standing, cross-cultural disputes.

A more democratic and culturally inclusive planning not only draws on many different ways of knowing and acting, but also has to develop a sensibility able to discern which ways are most useful in which circumstances. What has been missing from most of the collaborative planning/communicative action literature is this recognition of *the need for a language and a process of emotional involvement*, of embodiment. This means not only allowing the 'whole person' to be present in negotiations and deliberations, but being prepared to acknowledge and deal with the powerful emotions that underpin many planning issues. By working patiently, attentively, and non-judgementally in the early stages of her handling of the Redfern conflict, Sarkissian was able to deal with the fears that were at the heart of the matter. Why has this crucial dimension of planning conflict so often been ignored in favour of 'rational discourse'?

It is tempting to answer this question by charging that the planning profession works, collectively, in a state of arrested emotional development, bracketing the realm of the emotions as being unmanageable, ungovernable, downright dangerous. To a profession that defines itself as concerned with rational decision-making over land-use and resource management conflicts, it is not surprising that the realm of the emotions has been perceived as troublesome territory. The origins of planning in the engineering sciences, and later in administrative and management sciences (see Friedmann, 1987), is another important factor in understanding this avoidance of the emotional domain. How can you make a rational decision if you allow the emotions to become part of the conversation?

There are two problems with this historic dividing line between reason and the emotions. One is that it poses reason and emotion as mutually exclusive, as binary opposites. There is now a significant and respected literature that makes a persuasive case for 'the intelligence of the emotions' (Nussbaum, 2001) and the foolishness of trying to bracket them out of 'serious' deliberations.⁶ The other problem is that this historic dividing line precludes the possibility of understanding the nature of much conflict in the city, conflict that is generated by fears and hopes, anxieties and desires, memory and loss, anger about and fear of change. How can planners hope to resolve these conflicts unless they are prepared to get to the emotional heart of the matter?

Fortunately, there are signs of change: in the practice of people like Wendy Sarkissian, and in the writings of Howell Baum and John Forester. Baum has argued that when emotional language and behaviour is disallowed or discouraged by planners insisting that participants be rational, or that discussions follow a logical order, they will elicit only superficial participation. 'Told to be rational, people assume they have been told not to be themselves. They may feel relieved. Planning will not require them to reveal or risk what matters' (Baum, 1999: 12). Baum also suggests that it is important for planners working in emotionally charged situations not to try to suppress conflict, for to do so is to sabotage the work of grieving and healing which needs to be done as part of a process of change. Helping people to discuss their fears, he argues, is a way of seeing past them towards the future. Baum emphasizes that the planning process must create a transitional space, between past and future, 'where participants can share the illusion of being apart from time. They need to imagine stepping away from past memories without feeling they have lost their identity or betrayed the objects of memory. They must be able to imagine alternative futures without feeling obliged to enact any of them' (Baum, 1999: 11). This is what he calls the 'serious play' of a good deliberative planning process.

What particularly interests me about the philosophy underlying what I am calling a 'therapeutic' approach is the possibility of transformation: that is, of something beyond a merely workable trade-off or band-aid solution. Just as in successful therapy there is breakthrough and individual growth becomes possible, so too with a successful therapeutically oriented approach to managing our co-existence in the shared spaces of neighbourhoods, cities and regions, there is the capacity for collective growth. Or, to move from the language of therapy to that of politics, there is the possibility of social transformation, of a process of public learning that results in permanent shifts in values and institutions. In the case of Redfern, the values of local residents changed as they listened to the concerns and fears of others; and the local council, as an institution, changed its behaviour insofar as it was forced to recognize the importance of a genuine consultation process and the danger of listening to only one set of voices within its jurisdiction.

It hardly needs to be said that the success of this kind of planning work depends very much on the skills and wisdom of the practitioners involved. It would take a whole book to deal adequately with the kinds of preparation appropriate to this kind of work on deep-seated conflicts in cross-cultural contexts.⁷ At the very least, it involves training in negotiation and mediation, facilitation and consensus-building, organizing and working with groups of different sizes and different kinds of internal conflict. It involves some understanding of individual, group, and community psychology, as well as group and community dynamics; and some experience doing research in and about communities, with community members. We could learn a lot from anthropologists' methods. They tell us that getting to know another (group, or culture) takes more than a few meetings and/or a needs assessment survey. Understanding, and building trust, depends on spending time in a community; and it calls for in-depth talk, and not just discussions with formal leaders. They also tell us that every group we encounter has a culture (as does every observer/planner), which may be thick or thin, thoroughly or only partially defin-

ing and directing actions. Learning about any culture is an empirical and time-consuming task that requires a special attitude (Baum, 2000: 133). Planners need to learn about culture: what it is and what shapes and maintains it, how and why it changes, and how one's own culture affects one's ability to understand that of others.

The task of fully listening in multicultural conversations may have consequences for our identities. This is so because fully participating requires an openness that exposes us to other beliefs and ways of being in the world that we must consider alongside our own, *not by transcending difference but by acknowledging and fully engaging with it*. In such a process, we may become more aware of ourselves as well as the unfamiliar 'Other', resulting in the possibility of mutual creation of new understandings and meanings. My customary mental horizon is the set of possibilities I can imagine from within the framework of my beliefs, habits and values. Any time I encounter a situation that tests my prejudices (in the sense of prejudgements, or a disposition to judge), my horizons are likely to be redefined, if I can bring openness to the situation. We broaden our horizons by observing and reflecting deeply on the landscapes of other people's lives. In any multicultural conversation there is likely to be tension between (at least) two sets of prejudices/prejudgements. The challenge for multicultural planning consists in not covering up this tension by attempting a naïve assimilation of the two, but in consciously bringing it out, exploring it, and working through it. That was Sarkissian's skill in Redfern.

What else might we conclude about the wider significance of this Sydney case study? One point often raised by critics of participatory processes is the cost and time involved. The Redfern process involved a significant commitment of resources, and this cannot be expected to be available for every dispute that arises. My argument is that this approach is the best model in cases where prior histories of conflict have made more traditional negotiation techniques irrelevant. A second point relates to scale and significance. The conflict in this case was ostensibly over the fate of a 2200 square meter site, within one local municipality. The symbolic stakes, however, were considerably greater, especially for indigenous people, whose ongoing presence in the inner city seemed to be the hidden agenda and longer-term threat. So this small, localized conflict was, in the minds of most of those involved, about core issues of (Australian) history, about historic injustices, and about how personal and national identity is deeply intertwined with these issues. At *whatever* scale such conflicts arise – neighbourhood, city, or region – there is a strong case for using this therapeutic approach.⁸

Another critical point that needs to be extracted from this story relates to my opening question: how does change come about? I do not want to leave the impression that planners, if only they become 'therapists' in their practice, will rid the world of racism, sexism and other plagues. Remember that the (politically conservative) South Sydney Council initially attempted to rush through its preferred solution, and would have succeeded had not those residents (Anglo and indigenous) who supported the indigenous community mobilized, confronted and politically embarrassed the Council into conceding a more consultative approach. *A political space had to be created for this approach through political action*. Occasionally, planners themselves can create such a space, but only with the support of progressive political regimes. But in highly charged, highly

politicized conflicts, it is more likely that the planner's role will be to 'design' the space which has been created through political action. In the case of Redfern, once the space was created, the skills, courage, and commitment of the consultant were what made it possible to work through to a solution that dealt with the kinds of fears and anxieties previously discussed, rather than ignoring, marginalizing or overriding them. The courage, or risk factor, also needs to be emphasized. Sarkissian clearly took personal risks, including the risk of failure, in choosing this approach. *Daring to take risks* is one of the qualities I will emphasize in the final chapter (along with this therapeutic approach), as critical to a 21st-century planning imagination.

A final critical ingredient of the Redfern story was the *building of trust*, between the social planner and the various community factions, then among community factions, and finally between community and social planner and local council, developing new working and neighbouring relationships, and mending broken ones. One should not underestimate the inspirational value of such a story. And there are many more like it. There are Wendy Sarkissians in every city, but very few of their stories get told. That's a pity, because collectively they constitute a new breed of planner, sharing a transformative philosophy and always looking for opportunities to put it into practice.

Thinking critically, however, there is a clear limitation to this kind of practice. In this instance, it produced a better outcome, and seems to have transformed the values of some residents, creating the possibility for longer-term peaceful co-existence of indigenous and non-indigenous groups in the neighbourhood. But it's in the very nature of such a consultancy engagement that the practitioner is unlikely to have a more enduring effect on institutional practices. Has the South Sydney Council changed the way it makes decisions as a result of this one-off intervention? Probably not. Has the planning process itself become more inclusionary? No. For these broader changes to come about, there would have had to be more of a working relationship between consultant and council and planning staff and an openness to the possibility of a long-term, as opposed to a short-term fix. Political leadership is an important ingredient in, and institutional change an essential component of, lasting transformation. Our next two stories move in these directions.

EMERSON PARK, EAST ST LOUIS, USA: FROM ABANDONMENT TO HOPE

There's no such thing as a poor community. You can't talk about 'resources' in isolation. The greatest resources are human physical and psychological ones.

(King, 1981: 234)

The city of East St Louis was one of the hardest hit local economies in the USA during the deindustrialization decades of the 1970s and 1980s. The number of local businesses fell from 1527 to 383 and the number of locally employed residents from 12,423 to 2699 between 1970 and 1990 (Reardon, 1998: 324).⁹ The municipal unemployment rate

increased from 10.5 per cent to 24.6 per cent and the citywide poverty rate rose from 11 per cent to 39 per cent during this same period. As increasing numbers of working-class and middle income whites moved to the suburbs, the city's total population declined from 88,000 to 43,000 and the African American portion increased from 45 per cent to 98 per cent. As the property tax base declined drastically, the city was forced to cancel all but essential services, including a six-year halt in municipal trash collection. By 1991, when the city was unable to pay a court-mandated settlement to a person injured in the city jail, it was compelled to seek state bankruptcy protection. In the absence of city funds, a local judge ordered the transfer of the title to City Hall and 240 acres of city-owned waterfront property to the injured person to satisfy his claim (Reardon, 1998: 324).

The city may have reached rock bottom, but residents trapped in East St Louis by poverty as well as attached by historic ties were not about to give up on their neighbourhoods, in spite of increasing levels of drug-dealing on their streets, illegal dumping of garbage, and municipal abandonment. In the late 1980s, three dozen local churches formed the Metro-East Coalition of Church-Based Organizations to lobby municipal and state officials to do something about the substance abuse and illegal dumping problems. At the same time, in the state legislature, Wyvetter Younge, a representative from East St Louis, became chairperson of the Illinois House of Representatives Standing Committee on Education Appropriations. During a customarily routine presentation by the President of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC), requesting continuing state aid for the university, Representative Younge indicated that no money would be forthcoming until the university articulated its urban service commitment to distressed communities like East St Louis. Thus was put in motion what was to become, after a faltering start, a community-university partnership (the East St Louis Action Research Project, ESLARP) that would reverse the cycle of decline and bring hope to this abandoned community.


The remarkable story of this reversal begins with the hiring of Ken Reardon in 1990 by the UIUC Department of Urban Planning. Reardon had a decade of community organizing experience behind him in various US inner cities and was committed to an *empowerment* approach. This approach 'integrates the principles and methods of participatory action research, direct action organizing, and education for critical consciousness into a powerful new planning paradigm (Reardon, 1998: 326). Reardon's first step was to interview community leaders to get their views on the university's activities in the area over the past three years. What he learnt was a shock. Many community leaders had no idea there had even been a university project in existence. Those who were aware were extremely critical, describing university researchers as 'ambulance chasers' and 'carpet-baggers'. 'These interview findings prompted the faculty to abandon their top-down approach in favor of a more participatory, bottom-up, bottom-sideways approach to community planning in which residents identify the issues to be examined, participate in the collection of data, and collaborate in the analysis of this information' (Reardon, 1998: 325).

The first challenge was to overcome the suspicions, among residents, of the university and its researchers. Reardon's meetings with community leaders produced a five-point

protocol for the proposed partnership. The community insisted that the university agree to these points. First, the residents of Emerson Park and their organization, the Emerson Park Development Corporation (EPDC), would determine the issues that the university would work on. Second, local residents would be involved with the students through every step of the research and planning process. Third, UIUC's Department of Urban Planning must make a minimum five-year commitment to Emerson Park. Fourth, the University must help the EPDC gain access to regional funding agencies to secure the resources needed to implement local development projects. Fifth, the University must help the EPDC establish a non-profit organization to sustain the community revitalization process once the campus left the community. This resident-driven protocol, with its shrewd evaluation of previous failures of university 'assistance', drew on the principles of empowerment planning, insisting on participatory action research and community capacity-building. ✓

When the first class of students arrived in East St Louis with Reardon in autumn 1990, this is what they saw: 'Two-thirds of the city's downtown office buildings and retail stores were vacant. All of the city's street lights and traffic signals were dark because of the municipality's inability to pay its electric bill. The air smelled of burning garbage due to a six-year hiatus in residential trash collection . . . Forty per cent of the city's building lots were vacant and thirty per cent of its existing buildings were abandoned' (Reardon, 2003). The students already knew that Emerson Park's median family income was \$6738 and 75 per cent of its households were female-headed families with children. The poverty rate was 55 per cent. What they didn't know was that, alongside these grim statistics, was the reality of a feisty and grimly determined group of residents in Emerson Park, led by women like Ceola Davis and others at the Neighborhood House and through church-based organizations. At the first meeting with students, Miss Davis told how these local women had already launched their own community revitalization initiative by recruiting unemployed workers to convert three abandoned buildings across the road from the Day Care Centre into a playground. To do this, the women first had to determine who owned these derelict structures. Miss Davis led a neighbourhood delegation on a bus excursion to the County Administration Building to find out. When they discovered that the County had acquired the properties after tax default by their owners, Miss Davis organized a larger group of residents to attend a public hearing of the County Property Tax Disposition Committee, to request site control of the properties. Once that was granted, local volunteers began to demolish the derelict structures, brick by brick, and haul the materials to a salvage yard, where they garnered \$3000. Then residents sought matching funds from the city and charitable organizations. Nobody gave them a cent. The playground project was seen as 'too risky'. So another \$1000 was raised by selling fried chicken and catfish dinners on Friday nights. Then the residents, with the help of local contractors and settlement house volunteers, did the work themselves, constructing a 5000 square foot green space that, 15 years later, remains a source of great pride and inspiration.

On the one hand, the playground story tells us of the depths of hopelessness of the situation in this neighbourhood, and its total abandonment by the region's public and private institutions. On the other hand, the determination shown by the residents is a



due to the success story that followed from this first small step. In the winter of 1991, residents again mobilized their own labour, but this time with the help of hundreds of student volunteers from UIUC, to clean up the trash-filled lots. These first working bees were followed by others over the next two years that began repairs to residents' houses, using architectural expertise from UIUC and student and resident labour. Gradually state officials began to take note, and to offer small parcels of financial assistance for home improvement loans. Step by small step, one improvement was followed by another: neighbourhood beautification projects, public safety projects, and a concerted assault on drug-dealing activities with the help of the United States Attorney's office (Reardon, 2003).

There were several minor and major turning points in this story. One was a two-year Community Outreach Partnership Center Grant (COPC) for \$500,000 in 1995, followed by a one-year institutionalization grant, both from the US Department of Housing and Urban Development, which enabled ESLARP to expand its neighbourhood planning, community development, and technical assistance and leadership training activities. With the additional resources provided by COPC grants, ESLARP was able to extend its work to other neighbourhoods, again working with local residents to create a community stabilization plan, and then to devise specific projects to resolve specific community development challenges: such as crime prevention, youth development, housing improvement, and job generation. Another turning point was the ongoing challenge from the community to the university researchers to fully engage with the empowerment model by establishing a free 'neighbourhood college' where residents could be trained in a range of community organizing and development skills: community-based crime prevention, environmental racism, non-profit management, grantsmanship, direct action organizing, and so on. In the spring of 1995, 43 community leaders completed the first course on community organization offered through this new adult education programme. Courses were designed to provide community activists with the knowledge and skills required to better understand the structural factors that were driving the uneven patterns of development within the Greater St Louis Metro Region (Reardon, 1998: 326).

A third turning point was the initiative, yet again from the amazing Miss Davis, to lobby for a light rail route through Emerson Park. Miss Davis had learnt that the region's transportation authority was preparing plans to extend St Louis's highly successful light rail line from downtown St Louis across the river to Scott Airforce Base in Southwestern Illinois. Miss Davis saw this as an opportunity to use an abandoned, state-owned, railroad right of way that ran through East St Louis's poorest neighbourhoods, as the route for the proposed light rail. If this was successful, and a station could be built in East St Louis, it would give local residents access to living-wage jobs in St Louis's central business and international airport districts. Miss Davis asked Reardon to recruit planning and design colleagues to prepare a cost-benefit study of using the existing right-of-way. She also requested assistance in securing funds to purchase land around potential rail station sites, so that community organizations could then bargain with would-be investors. All this came to pass. The route was approved. The land was acquired, and subsequently a developer was found who wanted to turn the land around the Emerson Park

station into a mixed housing project (the Parsons Place project), with 40 per cent affordable housing. By 1999, \$30 million had been raised to go ahead with that project and the City of East St. Louis completed the sewer, street, sidewalk, lighting and other improvements required for the project to go ahead.

By 2000 the EPDC/UIUC Partnership had produced plans that led to more than \$45 million in new public and private investment in this once devastated neighbourhood that only a decade earlier could not raise a thousand dollars of outside assistance for its playground. The EPDC had been transformed from a voluntary organization into a well-respected community development corporation. Thanks to federal funding, the University's Neighborhood Technical Assistance Center, established in 1995, has helped more than 60 non-profit agencies in the region. The EPDC secured funding for a YouthBuild Program to train unemployed residents in the building trades. A foundation has opened a state-of-the-art youth recreation and development centre within walking distance of the Parsons Place housing project. A local chemical plant that had been a major problem to the neighbourhood was bought by a Scandinavian company with an excellent environmental and labour record and an intention of training local residents for jobs in the plant. Last, but not least, over this decade some 3500 UIUC students have had powerful and, for some, life-transforming learning experiences that have challenged their values and beliefs as well as their intellects and planning skills (Reardon, 2003).

COMMENTARY: EMPOWERMENT PLANNING

These incredible achievements in the space of a decade can be attributed to a number of factors. Reardon's various accounts attribute success primarily to the extraordinary leadership of Miss Davis and others from within the East St Louis community. That was clearly a major factor. The capacity of that community to imagine alternatives, to come up with daring schemes, and to follow through on details and with hard work, is a lesson to anyone who doubts the capacity of communities to shape their own destinies. In Emerson Park, whose households were predominantly female-headed, the role of the church and of faith-based organizations has to be noted as providing one source of strength. Another was the experience of these older women in the civil rights movement over the previous three decades. Still, this has been the story of a partnership, a collaboration with the university, in which Reardon's own skills and commitment were crucial to the positive outcomes. Reardon himself would say that the key to success was the *empowerment model*, the commitment to participatory action research, direct action organizing, and education for critical consciousness. I would add two things to this analysis. One is the importance of the participatory action researcher's interpersonal skills: Reardon had the capacity to establish trust, working in this cross-cultural context in which there was initially great suspicion and scepticism on the part of the community. Part of that capacity was his radical openness, including openness to criticism from the community, and a real capacity to listen. Listening to Reardon tell this story to a workshop in the summer of 2000, I was struck by his capacity to inspire and motivate, to tell

an inspiring story, and that capacity no doubt played a part in motivating students to become involved in this challenging project.

Another key factor in this success story of empowerment planning is that the mobilized community cannot do it all by themselves. Building a playground from scratch through local sweat is one thing, but new housing and light rail projects do not get built that way. At some point, mobilized communities have to engage with various arms of the state, and with private investors, to realize these larger projects. The residents of East St Louis knew (at least) two things. One was the power of demonstration, through their own early efforts, in attracting attention and interest from state agencies. The other is the importance of entering negotiations from a position of strength, as when they acquired land likely to increase in value once a light rail station was built. Their community stabilization and revitalization depended, along the way, on financial resources from the State Treasurer, on the added capacity created by the federal HUD grant, on the federal drug enforcement agency's undercover action in tackling the city's crack-cocaine dealing areas, and finally on attracting 'quality' companies and developers into the area, who would share the residents' commitment to endogenous development, that is, to developing local resources. The older residents also knew that it was important to train a new generation of leaders from within the community, so they pressed successfully for the 'neighbourhood college'.

Finally this story represents two things. There is a core story that is about *the organization of hope*. The work of the community leaders, and of the leading activist planner through this decade-long struggle, can be described as the work of organizing hope. That is a very human story in which individuals support and inspire each other against massive odds. And then there is the story about those massive odds, the story of structural change that decimates communities, the story of an already historically marginalized community which is further excluded by technological changes over which it has no control. But the residents of East St Louis refused to accept the plot that had been scripted for them by these forces. They were able to imagine another story, and envisage themselves as actors in that alternative story. In such ways do apparently impervious structures become porous and somewhat malleable.

BIRMINGHAM, UK: CREATING COSMOPOLIS IN THE 'POSTCOLONIAL WORKSHOP OF THE WORLD'

I now resume the Birmingham story where I left it off in Chapter 1, at the turn of the 21st century. Since the mid-1980s the City Council had been engaged in an ambitious and expensive physical regeneration of downtown that had achieved some of its aims (like making the downtown more attractive as a tourist and convention destination) but had also depleted the budget available for schools and housing and thus had increased social deprivation and jeopardized the next generation of Brummies, the human capital of the city. Further, this assumed link between the urban economy and the urban fabric (fix up

the physical city and the investors will come) had ignored the ethno-cultural complexity of the 'metropolis of the midlands'. On the one hand, the new physical environment that was in place by the mid-1990s was the platform from which to tell a new story about the city, a city now opening itself to the outside, a lively and attractive metropolis, open to the 'new economy'. On the other hand, this new vision reproduced not only the socio-economic exclusions of the previous era, but also the socio-cultural marginalizing. Birmingham's multi-ethnic, multi-racial society was not part of the new image.

All this began to shift in the late 1990s. A new generation of political leadership in the Council encouraged the hiring of key new council staff, who in turn started to shake up a rather traditional city bureaucracy that had been too cosily Labour and clientelist in the past. Nationally, a Labour government in power since 1997 had produced money for innovative social policies, and these funds had brought community programmes and thus activists to the foreground. These activists challenged the vision of the Council as being a very partial one, neglectful of the needs of the poorest neighbourhoods and of the cultural diversity of the city. The Council responded with Highbury 3, a three-day workshop in February 2001 to revisit the city's strategic vision. This extraordinary participatory event (designed with the help of the consultants Charles Landry and Phil Wood of Comedia) engaged over 100 local activists from all sections of the city. It symbolized the Council's acknowledgement that the economic development vision of the 1980s had failed to create economic prosperity beyond a narrow range of middle-class beneficiaries, and had not provided a culturally inclusive representation of the city. The challenge was to work together to create a new vision and a new set of strategies that would shift attention from downtown regeneration to the neighbourhoods, and would involve all residents of this postcolonial city. A consensus emerged that the new emphasis should be on 'place making' (nurturing the neighbourhoods), not rather than, but as well as, 'place marketing' (the necessary promotion of the city to investors). One aspect of this consensus was recognition of the need for multiracial and multiethnic coalitions to struggle against established patterns of exclusion, to end the competition between ethnic groups, and to link immigrant and poor neighbourhoods with downtown politics and urban economy.


I was a speaker at that event, and followed up a year later spending some time in the city, getting to know people (politicians, planners, community activists, youth, musicians . . .), visiting some pilot projects that had emerged out of Highbury 3, and running some workshops for the city council, on cultural diversity and on economic development. What was immediately significant was that in the intervening year since Highbury 3, at a time when three northern British cities had experienced what were being called 'race riots', Birmingham was calm, and was even referred to in the national press as a positive example of a city trying to come to terms with its diversity and social exclusion issues. Had something changed in Birmingham? Arguably what had made some symbolic difference was the fact that Birmingham had held its own Stephen Lawrence inquiry (see Chapter 1) and that inquiry had publicly named a long-standing problem, the history of institutionalized racism. What I saw at neighbourhood level were some interesting and brave efforts to tackle this.

In Handsworth – a multiethnic neighbourhood where three generations of immigrant

exclusion is visible on the streets and in the run-down housing – a series of innovative programmes were growing out of the Community Fire Station. This local institution is also a community centre, and from it run a variety of promising programmes: anti-racist and anti-gang programmes staffed by young (and not so young) Black men, some of whom have done time and don't want the next generation to repeat their mistakes, others of whom have made it in the music business and provide classes for local youth on how to follow in their footsteps, how to 'learn the biz'; cooperative street-beat policing by the Metropolitan Police working alongside the Rasta-inspired Haile Selassie Peace Force, working in pairs, responding to racial tension on the streets and breaking down stereotyped views on both sides (police and community); significant efforts to diversify the racial and ethnic composition of the police and fire brigade; the training of locals as community safety wardens; and an effort by the professional football clubs to reach out to Black and Asian youths. The talk, at this grass roots level, was of 'breaking down barriers and stereotypes' and 'connecting communities'. People of different ethnicities, ages, gender, religious and class backgrounds were working on a common project: the desire to build a more cohesive and prosperous local community, and one that would be more integrated socially and economically into the larger city around it.

What I also heard and observed were levels of internalized anger among young people of colour in Birmingham that would be familiar to anyone who has worked in an American inner city: anger over exclusion and lack of recognition; anger over their decaying neighbourhood; anger that new wealth being generated in the city is not coming to their neighbourhood. Alongside this anger is fear: fear of travelling beyond their neighbourhood; fear of entering 'white space' downtown; fear of gangs and violence; fear of succumbing to gang culture. And alongside this fear is desire: desire to make it, through self-employment; and desire for the city to make it, through a successful transition from a city of exclusion to a truly multicultural city. As long as this desire exists (rather than alienation or despair), there is hope for Birmingham, but . . .

There is not enough support yet, from the city or the central government, to give these local innovations time to grow and stabilize and make a difference; there are not enough connections between these marginalized communities and the city's planning mechanisms and horizons; and there are still too many voices in the city referring to themselves as 'indigenous' and expressing the belief that 'newcomers' or 'outsiders' (even if they've been around for three generations) should not have the same rights as 'real Brummies'. Within city hall there is a familiar institutional split between those who do economic development and those who do community and social development, exemplified in the prioritizing of a Master Plan for the redevelopment of Eastside (an old industrial neighbourhood adjacent to downtown), an all-too-familiar 'megaproject' approach that appears to have no connections with social development goals or with the multicultural, endogenous economic base of the city. There is unresolved conflict around who should 'own' any new programmes focusing on 'community cohesion', the new central government buzz phrase. There is an also familiar tension in the desire to empower local communities (including letting them make their own mistakes) and the reality that resources are centrally controlled and thus centrally accountable. I also had a sense that while community cohesion is the new slogan, there are not enough people (beyond the



Handsworth Community Fire Station) who know how to do it. Not enough Wendy Sarkissians. Not enough Ken Reardons. And certainly not the necessary links between the universities and communities, for capacity-building purposes. The admirable goals and efforts embodied in the Community Fire Station's programmes – programmes that understand the importance of working street by street, in cross-cultural coalitions, in order to rebuild neighbourhoods – are not yet receiving sufficient support from either city or central governments.

What is novel and exciting about Birmingham is the willingness on the part of city government to open up debate about the collective future of the city, and to rethink notions of a civic identity based on more inclusive ideas about who is and who isn't considered a Brummie. The Leader (Sir Albert Bore) and the then Deputy Leader (Andy Howell) of City Council have shown real leadership on this and other matters. Part of the art of leadership is the ability to recognize the need for change, and to welcome outsiders as well as encouraging insiders to help think a way through it. Ideas are crucial. So is a new discourse and symbolism about civic identity. So too is institutional reform, whether that be tackling racism or addressing the historic underprivileging of social versus economic development in the council's bureaucratic power structure. Birmingham's leadership is aware of and working on all of these issues.

In all of this 'work in progress' that is Birmingham trying to reinvent itself as a multicultural city (a story for which I have no ending), there is one conspicuous absence. That is the absence of any official city discourse around Birmingham as a postcolonial economy.¹⁰ But as economic geographers Henry, McEwan and Pollard (2000) have pointed out (based on census data), something like 33 per cent of Birmingham's business activity is within minority ethnic-owned enterprises. These are not 'third world comes to first' through ethnic entrepreneurial sweatshops. Rather they are examples of what geographers call 'new industrial spaces' and 'networks', and the production of new hybrid products (*ibid.*: 13). For example, there is a historic Chinese Quarter in Birmingham that signifies the traditional route of early Hong Kong migrants into the catering industry in the 1950s. But there is also a transnational Chinese community in the city, which has expanded its activity into property development, banking and supermarkets. A key element of the investment strategies of some transnational capital is through global, ethnic, community-based networks: the diaspora. Birmingham, as a multicultural city, is one such meeting place of the global diaspora (*ibid.*: 8).

The areas of Sparkbrook and Sparkhill include Pakistani banks operating within the usury laws of Islam and aimed at the UK's 1.5 million practising Muslims. Sparkhill is also the centre of the South Asian jewelry quarter, the retailing of clothes, saris, and other textiles. The city has a Greek-Cypriot fish-frying network which constitutes 25 per cent of the city's 300 fish and chip shops. There are more than 50 halal butchers, and Birmingham's National Halal Centre exports goods such as halal baby food all over Europe. One company makes a range of halal Chinese meals for British Muslims who otherwise cannot eat in Chinese restaurants. Birmingham is now famous for its Kashmiri balti, which is a hybrid product of British-Asian cultures. Other ethnic food producers supply Asian and Caribbean basics and delicacies for national markets. And then there is music. Birmingham is recognized as the centre for Banghra music in Britain, a sound based on

the fusion of Asian (specifically Punjabi), western and broader styles (such as reggae, soul, jazzfunk, hip-hop and rock). There are a large number of bands in the city, several recording and distribution companies, and a vibrant club scene. Birmingham-based Apache Indian was the first South Asian British musician to break into the mainstream British charts in the early 1990s. His music 'epitomizes the hybrid nature of the fusion musical scene in Birmingham' (*ibid.*: 10).

What all this suggests to Henry, McEwan and Pollard is that Birmingham is home to a diversity of 'cultural capitalisms' that makes its economy both local and global. They see a unique occurrence of and opportunity for a kind of 'globalization from below' that could combat the social and economic polarization that has accompanied the 'globalization from above' scenarios of the flagship projects (*ibid.*: 15). They describe Birmingham as a 'locus of ethnic community-based economic networks' that may be producing a distinctive competitive advantage for the city. Exploring these networks offers a more relational way of thinking about Birmingham as a city and its insertion in the national/global economy. It also suggests that City Council's economic development planners need to embrace the notion of multicultural economic development. 'This is about recognizing the cultural diversity of economic activity in policy terms and encouraging it in the expectation that such diversity brings with it a broadening of the economic base' (*ibid.*: 16). Further attention to this hitherto invisible sector might reveal how to 'mobilize diversity as a source of both social cohesion and urban economic competitiveness' (Amin, 1997: 134).

CONCLUSIONS

From these three very different stories of change, both achieved and in progress, in contexts where change for the better often seemed highly unlikely, we can tease out some conclusions about the 'who and how' of transformative planning practices: about the intersecting roles of residents, planners, mobilized communities, powerful stakeholders, and city governments; about power and power imbalances; about the role of emotions in dealing with difference and exclusion; and about the importance of institutionalizing apparently transformative initiatives.

In the story from Sydney, I focused on the conflict resolution and mediation skills of the planner, arguing that without her insight into and attempt to get at what was *really* going on in this dispute over land use, no land use solution could have been arrived at that would have been acceptable to the conflicting parties. I described her approach as 'therapeutic'. But I also noted that without the prior resident mobilization that put pressure on the local council, the political space would not have been created for her intervention. So resident mobilization – in response to lack of community consultation from council – was the catalyst for a new approach. The skill of the social planner was in designing a safe space in which antagonistic residents could speak the unspeakable, but could also listen to others doing the same, and hear what mattered to those others. She created the space for a multicultural conversation, out of which new meanings emerged.

In Redfern, there was space and scope for mediation, for community learning, and these produced changes. But it would be foolish to suggest that mediation should *always* be the strategy of choice. Forester talks about this, remarking on the question of power, and power imbalances, which has long been a sore point with critics of communicative action approaches (see Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 2002). 'Collaborative problem-solving can only be truly collaborative when the power of parties is balanced enough to make them interdependent, to make their problem-solving a joint enterprise, not the decision of one party visited upon the others' (Forester, 2000: 167). He does not deny that courts and legislatures are sometimes the more appropriate avenue to redress or protect the rights of those with less power. Susskind *et al.* (1999) have made a similar argument, that mediation processes can complement, but not substitute for, legal and political processes in which weaker parties might gain real protections of their resources or entitlements.

In the Redfern story, I intentionally foregrounded the work of an individual planner because I wanted to demonstrate that individuals do have agency and can make a difference. The difference in that case was that a more culturally inclusive solution was found to a local land-use dispute because the planner was able to create the space in which values were questioned, and attitudes shifted. That is vitally important work. But, I also noted that there was no apparent legacy of this intervention in terms of institutional change. The city council that brought in the consultants did so in order to put out a fire, rather than to rethink their own *modus operandi*. The South Sydney council, unlike that of Birmingham, had not questioned its own practices or understandings. Absent that kind of shift, enduring change is unlikely.

If the planning enterprise is to be a transformative one (irrespective of whose definition of transformative is at work), then there must be 'some institutional position from which to articulate and prosecute a transformative agenda' (Healey, 2003: 1).¹¹ What is missing in the Redfern story is such an institutional base. In the East St Louis story, that base begins as a coalition between a university and a community organization, but ripples out over time to embrace state and local politicians, government agencies, and the business community. In East St Louis we saw that to bring about significant change involves a mix of ingredients, from individual qualities and leadership skills, to long-term commitment to strengthening the organizational capacities of community-based organizations, to the politics of involving and interacting with state agencies and representatives of the private sector, such as housing and commercial project developers. When historically marginalized groups mobilize to fight their exclusion they need all the help they can get: from capacity-building to coalitions, from planners with multicultural skills to planners with plain old technical skills, from sweat equity to federal funding.¹²

In the ongoing saga of Birmingham's reinvention of itself, the lead role has been taken by an action-oriented yet self-critical city council. At the scale of a city-region like Birmingham, many forces need to be in alignment for successful transformation. These include new ideas about economic development, new discourses about identity and belonging, new sources of funding for community-based programmes, new institutional arrangements within city council, and between council and the variety of ethno-cultural capital networks. All of this might be thought of as planning work, but not all of it is

done by planners. Some of it is done by politicians, some by residents and community organizations, some by combinations of these acting together. The effort of social transformation, in other words, of building *cosmopolis*, is a necessarily combined effort, by residents, planners, and politicians at local, state, and national levels. What remains to be underlined is that this effort is not only about mobilizing resources and power, and changing institutions, but also about *organizing hope, negotiating fears, mediating collective memories of identity and belonging, and daring to take risks*. In the next chapter, I take these cases further in my exploration of the importance of story and storytelling in transformative planning.